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CloudEdge Phase 5.1 AWS Provider Executor Smoke

Result: PASS

Date: 2026-05-31 UTC
Branch/build: main / routerd v20260528.2308 (92f4cc94) with local validator fix for execute.providerAction
Evidence bundle: /home/imksoo/routerd-labs/cloudedge-sam/evidence/20260530T235341Z-phase5-aws-rebaseline-92f4cc94

Scope​

  • Provider mutation scope: AWS only.
  • Account/region: 350538780953 / ap-northeast-1.
  • Reused routerd-only SAM lab: SourceLab=routerd-cloudedge-sam-aws-pve.
  • Target router instance: routerd-cloud-aws / i-05b6cfd2b3e4e0da6.
  • Target client instance: aws-cloud-client / i-0ae791389518353d6.
  • Target ENI: eni-0904ccbed8d383f65.
  • Captured address: 10.88.60.9.

Rebaseline​

Before mutation, the existing SAM lab was reset to a fresh provider baseline:

  • 10.88.60.9 secondary private IP removed from eni-0904ccbed8d383f65.
  • SourceDestCheck=true restored on the ENI.
  • Post-reset evidence: aws-router-eni-post-reset.json, aws-router-eni-post-reset-confirm.json.

IAM Gate​

routerd-cloud-aws received an EC2 instance profile for the executor.

The inline policy allowed only:

  • ec2:DescribeNetworkInterfaces
  • ec2:AssignPrivateIpAddresses
  • ec2:UnassignPrivateIpAddresses
  • ec2:ModifyNetworkInterfaceAttribute

Mutation permissions were scoped to:

  • Region: ap-northeast-1
  • ENI ARN: arn:aws:ec2:ap-northeast-1:350538780953:network-interface/eni-0904ccbed8d383f65
  • Resource tag: Project=routerd-cloudedge-phase5

Instance role preflight passed from the router:

  • aws sts get-caller-identity returned arn:aws:sts::350538780953:assumed-role/routerd-phase5-aws-executor-role/i-05b6cfd2b3e4e0da6.
  • aws ec2 describe-network-interfaces could read the target ENI.

Executor Run​

aws-provider-executor was built and installed on routerd-cloud-aws.

Two action journal entries were imported, approved, dry-run, and executed:

  • assign-secondary-ip
    • Result: succeeded
    • Message: assigned 10.88.60.9 to eni-0904ccbed8d383f65
  • ensure-forwarding-enabled
    • Result: succeeded
    • Message: disabled SourceDestCheck on eni-0904ccbed8d383f65 (prior=true)
    • Observed journal fact: priorSourceDestCheck=true

AWS validation after mutation:

  • ENI primary: 10.88.60.4
  • ENI secondary: 10.88.60.9
  • SourceDestCheck=false

Dataplane Validation​

Cloud side:

  • routerctl doctor hybrid: overall=pass, pass=12, warn=0, fail=0, skip=1.
  • Delivery route: 10.88.60.9 dev wg-hybrid metric 120.
  • Local OS address absence: 10.88.60.9/32 absent from local interfaces.
  • MSS clamp: routerd_mss covers ens5 -> wg-hybrid.

On-prem side:

  • router07 routerctl doctor hybrid: overall=pass, pass=13, warn=0, fail=0, skip=1.
  • Proxy ARP claim for cloud client 10.88.60.7 remained healthy.

Client connectivity:

  • cloud-client 10.88.60.7 -> onprem-client 10.88.60.9 ping: 3/3, 0% packet loss.
  • onprem-client 10.88.60.9 -> cloud-client 10.88.60.7 ping: 3/3, 0% packet loss.
  • cloud -> onprem SSH preserved source:
    • SSH_CONNECTION=10.88.60.7 ... 10.88.60.9 22
  • onprem -> cloud SSH preserved source:
    • SSH_CONNECTION=10.88.60.9 ... 10.88.60.7 22
  • Default gateways unchanged:
    • cloud-client: default via 10.88.60.1 dev ens5
    • onprem-client: default via 10.88.60.1 dev eth0
  • NAT: absent by SSH source preservation.

Rollback And Restore​

Rollback was exercised through routerctl action rollback:

  • ensure-forwarding-enabled rollback dry-run: would re-enable SourceDestCheck.
  • assign-secondary-ip rollback dry-run: would unassign 10.88.60.9.
  • Live rollback result:
    • action 2: rolledBack, restored SourceDestCheck=true.
    • action 1: rolledBack, unassigned 10.88.60.9.

Final teardown used option B: restore the previous SAM lab state.

  • 10.88.60.9 secondary private IP present again.
  • SourceDestCheck=false.
  • routerd-cloud-aws: stopped.
  • aws-cloud-client: stopped.

Cost state:

  • EC2 compute stopped.
  • Existing EIP/disk/NIC/VPC lab resources remain as the reusable SAM lab state.

Notes​

  • A code bug was found and fixed locally during the run: PluginSpec schema and executor resolver supported execute.providerAction, but pkg/config/validate_plugin.go still rejected it.
  • The forwarding action also needed target.address=10.88.60.9 so ProviderActionPolicy.allowedCIDRs could gate the action without weakening policy.